

## Message Text

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44

ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 SCCT-01 NSC-05 NSCE-00

INR-05 CIAE-00 SAB-01 PM-03 DODE-00 L-01 RSC-01 /041 W

----- 098284

R 180944Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY DOHA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 34

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 44

LIMDIS

BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR XF QA US

SUBJECT : AMIR OF QATAR'S VIEWS ON MID EAST SITUATION

1. SUMMARY: AMIR OF QATAR SEES PRESENT MID EAST SITUATION AS FROZEN AND DANGEROUS, BUT SETTLEMENT STILL POSSIBLE IF US VIGOROUSLY PURSUES STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WITH CONCURRENT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. AMIR APPEARS TO APPRECIATE PROBLEMS CAUSED ISRAELIS BY PLO'S PUBLIC POSTURE DEMANDING DISMANTLING OF ISRAELI STATE, AND HE MAY TALK TO PLO LEADERSHIP ON THIS POINT. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING DEC 17 CONVERSATION, SHAYKH KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL THANI, AMIR OF QATAR, GAVE ME HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT MID EAST SITUATION.

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HE DESCRIBED PRESENT SITUATION AS "FROZEN AND DANGEROUS". KHALIFA

SAID

THERE IS TIME-FUSE ON AREA WHICH WOULD BURN FOR ABOUT SIX MORE MONTHS, AND, IF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT NOT MADE DURING THIS PERIOD, ANOTHER WAR VIRTUALLY A CERTAINTY. HE ASSERTED HIS CONTINUING BELIEF THAT US ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY PRESSURE ON ISRAELIS TO MAKE MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS, WAS KEY TO SETTLEMENT. AMIR AGREED WITH SECRETARY'S EMPHASIS ON STEP-BY-STEP PROCEDURE, BUT STRESSED THAT WE'D BETTER GET GOING. HE SPECIFIED THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI WOULD HAVE TO BE PARALLELED BY A SIMILAR PULL BACK IN GOLAN TO KEEP SYRIANS ON NEGOTIATING TRACK.

3. IN LIGHT OF HIS ENDORSEMENT OF STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, I ASKED KHALIFA FOR HIS OPINION OF INCREASING CALLS FROM CAIRO AND DAMASCUS FOR RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. KHALIFA REPLIED THAT IN HIS VIEW, GENEVA FORUM WOULD BE USEFUL ONLY TO RATIFY SETTLEMENT ALREADY WORKED OUT AMONG PARTIES WITH US HELP. HE SAID IF NEGOTIATING WAS DONE AT GENEVA, SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE WOULD BE INSERTED, AND HE DID NOT RPT NOT FAVOR THIS.

4. RE PLO, KHALIFA OBSERVED IT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ARABS AND "RECOGNIZED" BY THE UN, AND US AND ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO LEARN TO LIVE WITH THIS SITUATION. I REPLIED THAT PLO'S PUBLIC POSTURE AT UN AND ELSEWHERE DEMANDING DISMANTLING OF ISRAELI STATE WAS DAMAGING TO POSSIBILITIES OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT; ARAFAT'S STATEMENTS HAD CONFIRMED ISRAEL'S WORST FEARS, AND HAD MADE MORE RIGID GOI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PALESTINIAN ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT. KHALIFA REPLIED THAT IF ARAFAT HAD SAID ANYTHING DIFFERENT, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DEPOSED IN A MATTER OF HOURS. HE POINTED OUT THAT OTHER ARABS DID NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THIS PLO POSITION, AND HAD CLEARLY INDICATED THEY READY TO CO-EXIST WITH AN ISRAELI STATE, MORE OR LESS WITHIN PRE-JUNE 1967 BOUNDARIES. IN ANY CASE, KHALIFA SAID, EVEN IF ARABS WISHED TO DISMANTLE ISRAEL, THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF THIS, GIVEN WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS OF US, SOVIETS, EUROPEANS AND MAJORITY OF WORLD COMMUNITY.

5. KHALIFA ASKED WHA WOULD BE REQUIRED OF PLO TO UNFREEZE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD IT. I ANSWERED THAT PLO'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RESOLUTION 242 WOULD BE MINIMUM REQUIRED. KHALIFA SAID HE SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF PLO ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 IN NEAR CONFIDENTIAL

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OR LONG TERM. ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED THAT PLO'S POSITION MIGHT EVOLVE IN THIS DIRECTION, HE DID NOT SEE POSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD POSSIBLY SIGN ON TO 242. I REMINDED AMIR THAT IT WAS HE WHO SAID TIME WAS SHORT FOR MOVEMENT TOWARDS SETTLEMENT; LOOSENING OF PLO POSITION REQUIRED FOR ANY SUCH MOVEMENT.

6. AMIR ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFICULTIES PLO PUBLIC POSITION CAUSED FOR ISRAELIS. HE SAID HE WISHED TO THINK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM,

AND WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME FURTHER ABOUT IT. HE SAID HE KNOW ARAFAT AND KHALID HASSAN VERY WELL, AND HE WOULD CONSIDER SPEAKING TO THEM DIRECTLY. HE EXPRESSED HIGH REGARD FOR HASSAN, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A "THINKER" IN CONTRAST TO ARAFAT THE "POLITICIAN".

7. COMMENT: I NEITHER ENCOURAGED NOR DISCOURAGED AMIR FROM TAKING INITIATIVE WITH PLO OFFICIALS. I SIMPLY THANKED HIM FOR HIS INTEREST, AND SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING ANY THOUGHTS HE MIGHT DEVELOP.  
PAGANELLI

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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